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Social scientists, like all professionals, like to scrutinize themselves and 
their neighbors within their preferred disciplinary frame. Economists, for 
instance, are particularly fond of the economics of their own discipline and 
have produced a stream of papers about the rankings and performance of 
individual authors, departments, and journals. For their part, sociologists 
and political scientists have been partial to relational representations, 
thinking about their own field and subfields through the prism of dynamic 
positions and oppositions. Historians and historically inclined scholars, 
including historians of economics, are often eager to specify how the social 
sciences’ embeddedness in broader political and economic processes (such 
as colonial expansion, the Great Depression, the Cold War, or the rise of 
the welfare state) has shaped their intellectual trajectory. The concern, 
often, is to try to identify where new ideas come from: cumulative knowl-
edge within well organized and paradigmatic disciplines; relational and 
demographic dynamics within and across fields; and exchanges with or 
demands from other domains of social life altogether—social movements, 
business corporations, or government agencies.
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Besides the question of origin is the question of how new ideas manage 
to diffuse and become institutionalized. Mobilization, institutional inno-
vation, and politics are usually part of the story. People who have an inter-
est invest in the game of defending these ideas, and through that process 
carry them and themselves forward. But their effectiveness often depends 
on more structural conditions, for instance, a crisis opening up a discur-
sive “structure of opportunity,” a favorable distribution of material and 
symbolic resources, or the need to fill vacancy chains caused by genera-
tional turnover or a field’s rapid expansion (White 1970, Bourdieu and 
Passeron 1979). These are the ingredients that allow challengers and 
their views to gain ground, settle into orthodoxy and, finally, to become 
“doxa”—a field’s naturalized and taken-for-granted beliefs about the way 
the world works.
In this paper we endeavor to reveal the intellectual and social condi-
tions that enabled the emergence and institutionalization of what we call 
the “neoliberal common sense of capital” in economics and the broader 
economy—what others have called the “shareholder value” view of the 
American firm. We focus on the social trajectory of Michael Jensen, a 
Chicago finance PhD turned Harvard Business School professor. Not that 
Jensen was the only promoter of this view. We will see that he was part of 
a much broader, and not necessarily well coordinated, movement that 
spanned both academia and the corporate world. Jensen’s scientific posi-
tion was supported by the rise of a generation of corporate raiders aggres-
sively advancing new financial practices and discourses (Heilbron, Ver-
heul, and Quak 2014); these actors, in turn, benefited from the legitimation 
and support offered by one of the most skilled academic entrepreneurs of 
the new “financial economics” (Dobbin and Jung 2010).
Thus our empirical narrative seeks to capture the interpenetration 
among the personal, the institutional, and the ideational—among an indi-
vidual’s career; the changing institutional dynamics within his field (in 
this specific case, the relevant transformation is the rise of business 
schools as major power players within the discipline of economics); and 
the diffusion of economic theories, management practices, and natural-
ized ways of looking at the corporation. Jensen’s work, commonly under-
stood as “agency theory,” not only drew inspiration from but actively 
endorsed, and in some ways enabled, the transformations in corporate 
management and governance that swept through the corporate world in 
the last decades of the twentieth century—from the junk bond market in 
the 1980s to the exponential growth of CEO pay in the 1990s to the share-
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1. Though Meckling never got a formal degree, he did graduate work in economics at Chi-
cago. Jensen earned a PhD in Economics, Finance and Accounting from the University of Chi-
cago Graduate School of Business in 1968. At the time when “Theory of the Firm” was written, 
Meckling was the dean of the Graduate School of Management at the University of Rochester, 
at which Jensen was an Associate Professor.
holder value management strategies of the 2000s (Khurana 2002; Lazon-
ick and O’Sullivan 2000; Lazonick 2014).
Herein, indeed, lies the second purpose of our paper. The debate about 
the spread of neoliberal ideas and governance tools has largely centered 
on the transformations of the state and international institutions (e.g., 
Krippner 2011), on the one hand, and on the role of actively organized 
intellectual networks, such as the Mont Pelerin Society, on the other. (e.g., 
Mirowski and Plehwe 2009) To the extent that whatever happens to cor-
porations is a direct outcome of state policies—e.g., deregulation, loosen-
ing of anti-trust regulations, etc.—this line of analysis is necessary. Yet, 
many transformations in corporate governance travel through different 
channels and can stay relatively invisible to state actors for a long time. 
They diffuse primarily through corporate boards, business magazines, 
consulting firms, and business schools. Nigel Thrift (2005) refers to these 
channels as “the cultural circuit of capital,” whose business it is to pro-
duce a narrative about the purpose of the corporation and justifications for 
how to make money. The neoliberal reconfiguration of firms is not simply 
derivative of the neoliberal reconfiguration of states or a by-product of the 
general diffusion of neoliberal ideas. Rather, we need to identify the spe-
cific carriers of that particular transformation in the amorphous space of 
“business discourse” in America.
Rethinking the Corporation
One of the most cited articles in the entire postwar economics literature 
was published in 1976 under the title: “Theory of the Firm: Managerial 
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure.” The paper’s two 
authors, Michael Jensen and William Meckling, were products of the Uni-
versity of Chicago economics nebulae and both held positions at the Uni-
versity of Rochester business school at the time.1 Michael Jensen had 
founded the Journal of Financial Economics a few years earlier, and he 
was still editing this then-minor journal when his joint contribution with 
Meckling appeared in it. How, then, did this piece, “marginal” from the 
point of view of academic economics, become so important that by 2005 
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a prominent critic faulted its authors for unleashing what he saw as ram-
pant corporate amorality and the breakdown of managerial ethics as 
revealed in a seemingly endless string of corporate scandals (Ghoshal 
2005)? To understand this, we have to go back to the individuals who 
wrote the article, their social trajectory, and the economic and social con-
ditions that enabled their vocabulary and concepts to entrench themselves 
as the new “common sense” of capital.
As of March 2016, “Theory of the Firm” boasted almost 10,000 cita-
tions in the Web of Science and close to 57,000 citations on Google Scholar, 
a truly staggering number for a single social science paper. The second 
reason that prompts our interest here is the affinity between the authors’ 
ideas—defended in this and other related scientific publications—and dis-
courses emanating from the real world of economic governance: the busi-
ness press, executive boardrooms, and the institutional machineries sur-
rounding American corporations. We will describe the narrative put 
forward in “Theory of the Firm” before analyzing how the diffusion of 
these ideas intertwines with the career of their chief promoter: Michael 
Jensen.
The Academic Career of a Paper
In 2006, Kim, Morse, and Zingales reported that “Theory of the Firm” 
was the third most cited article in the entire discipline of economics since 
1970 (Kim et al. 2006). Four other articles by Michael Jensen made the 
top 150 most influential economics papers list. The pattern of citation has 
been enduring, and also cumulative. Until 2009–2010, Jensen’s most 
prominent publications garnered, on the whole, more citations annually 
than in the previous year. Figure 1 below reports on the growing promi-
nence of Michael Jensen’s work within social science since 1973, as mea-
sured by his ten most cited publications, many of which expand and refine 
the practical conclusions of the original article.
So what was the message? Quite simply, “Theory of the Firm” argues 
that corporations always pay “agency costs,” which the authors define as 
the monitoring and bonding costs that a principal (a firm’s owner, i.e., its 
shareholders) faces to insure that its agents (i.e., the firm’s managers) act 
in accordance with that principal’s interests. To these expenditures, Jensen 
and Meckling add the “residual loss” that comes from “the divergence 
between the agent’s decisions and those decisions which would maximize 
the welfare of the principal” (1976, 308). Note that the “welfare of the 
principal” is maximized only when the stock market capitalization of the 
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2. Paul Douglas, the Chicago economist-turned-US senator, developed the functional form
known as the “Cobb-Douglas” production function with a colleague from mathematics.
firm is maximized: this is when the shareholders are most satisfied. The 
welfare of any other stakeholder in the firm—e.g., employees, customers, 
suppliers—appears irrelevant to this basic goal.
The Corporation Is Irrelevant
Today, “Theory of the Firm” seems like quintessential postwar Chicago 
price theory applied to the governance of corporations. Importantly, 
though, it was not a natural and straightforward extension in the Chicago 
view of the world at the time. As Ronald Coase had argued early on (1937), 
twentieth century economics did not really have a convincing account 
of the existence of firms; neither, in fact, did it care much about a firm’s 
internal workings and outcomes. The discipline represented the corpora-
tion as nothing but a production function;2 whatever happened within its 
walls was unexciting for theorists and attracted mostly practically oriented 
Figure 1 Annual citations of Michael Jensen’s work in Social Science 
Citation Index, 1975–2014
352 History of Political Economy 49:2 (2017)
3. John Kenneth Galbraith, of course, was more interested in the democratic and monopo-
listic effects of this transformation.
scholars in the institutionalist vein (e.g., Berle and Means 1932). This lack 
of concern for the allocation of resources within corporations was partic-
ularly evident at Chicago, where the reigning assumption was that firms 
only need competitive markets (that is, external pressures) to be efficient.
Chicago economists in the 1950s thus had little to say about what we 
now call “corporate governance,” specifically the processes, structures, 
and rules that affect the way a firm’s activities are organized and directed 
(Davis 2010). That was about to change dramatically over the next decade. 
Characteristically, however, the transformation did not come exactly from 
within, though part of the impetus was internal to the Chicago tradition. 
First was the growing empirical acknowledgement—increasingly diffi-
cult to brush aside—that modern American corporations had become 
extremely large and diversified, and were now run by a techno-structure 
of managers who were insufficiently accountable to stockholders and 
often driven by imperatives other than profit (Means 1962; Galbraith 
2007). The Keynesian mainstream of the profession was simultaneously 
perturbed and dismissive, but some at Chicago took notice. The question 
of size, in particular, was at the center of economic debates in the 1960s, 
pitting George Stigler against Joe Bain and John Kenneth Galbraith.3 Sti-
gler argued that many practices that were previously thought to harm 
competition—such as incumbents’ cost advantage and economies of 
scale—were in fact appropriate rewards for successful competitive behav-
ior: hence a large market share does not necessarily imply market power 
(Baker 2003, 192).
Some Chicago students, however, were skeptical about the pursuit of 
bigness and the diversification of firms at all costs. They thought it caused 
managers to behave in an inefficient manner, which decreased the market 
value of firms and therefore was harmful to the interests of shareholders. 
Milton Friedman, in fact, articulated a related argument in a premonitory 
article in the New York Times Magazine, titled “The Social Responsibility 
of Business is to Increase its Profits”:
In a free-enterprise, private-property system, a corporate executive is 
an employee of the owners of the business. He has direct responsibility 
to his employers. That responsibility is to conduct the business in accor-
dance with their desires, which generally will be to make as much 
money as possible while conforming to the basic rules of the society, 
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4. In 1932 Berie, a pro-regulation member of Franklin Roosevelt’s Brain Trust, was a
staunch exponent of the view that managers must have a financial interest in the corporation 
(he later revised it) and that their behavior must be subject to public accountability. His 
position thus supported both some appropriation of corporate assets by managers, as well as 
the regulation of their behavior to ensure what has come to be called “corporate social 
responsibility.”
both those embodied in law and those embodied in ethical custom. 
(Friedman [1970] 2007, 173–74)
Not that this argument was entirely new: it echoed an exchange from the 
1930s between Adolf Berle and E. Merrick Dodd Jr. in the Harvard Law 
Review. In the context of the Great Depression, the debate reflected Amer-
ican public opinion’s and law’s deep-rooted ambivalence toward the power 
of corporations (institutionalized in anti-trust legislation and federal regu-
latory oversight, and culminating in the trust-busting movement of the 
1910s). It also illustrated the newer public anxieties about the growing sep-
aration of ownership and control, which was creating a class of in-and-out 
stockholders with limited social and psychological ties to firms.4
The government’s penchant for acting directly on managers to ensure 
the viability of the corporation as a national and social institution was a 
recurring theme throughout the postwar period as well—from the military- 
industrial complex of the 1950s to the moral suasion of Democratic 
administrations relying on the discretionary power of corporate managers 
to stem inflation in the 1960s (Goodwin 1975). Meanwhile, popular man-
agement ideas extolled the socially responsible corporation, whose man-
agers could be made to act as promoters of the common good and the 
welfare of workers and communities (Drucker 1946).
These management ideologies seemed ripe for a critique, however. For 
one thing, they could be attacked as non-scientific, drawing from sociology 
(Bell 1971), psychology or philosophy. From the point of view of econom-
ics, there was no reason to think that managers were—or ought to be—
different kinds of people, driven by any other motive than self-interest. 
Furthermore, scholars closely associated with Chicago had begun to ques-
tion the idea that relations within firms are any different from any other 
market relations: “the firm has no power of fiat, no authority, no disci-
plinary action any different in the slightest degree from ordinary market 
contracting between any two people” (Alchian and Demsetz 1972, 777). 
Finally, American corporations and their shareholders were not doing so 
well under the managerial regime. Between 1965 and 1980, the rate of 
return for publicly traded companies fell from over 12 percent to below 
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6 percent (Poterba 1998). In 1974, Yale economist William Nordhaus pub-
lished an article that puzzled over the “crumbling” of corporate profit 
margins since 1966 (Nordhaus 1974). The Zeitgeist was changing.
The Corporation Doesn’t Really Exist
As Michael Jensen tells the story, his and Meckling’s article was the out-
come of an assignment they received from fellow Rochester economics 
professor and libertarian advocate Karl Brunner, for a seminar he was 
running in Interlaken, Switzerland that brought together scholars from 
east and west:
In 1971 Karl asked Bill and I to give a paper on the social responsibility 
of business. And Milton Friedman had written his New York Times 
Magazine piece that—I don’t remember the title, but it was something 
like “the social responsibility in business was to maximize profits”. . . 
And so Bill and I didn’t really—we weren’t wild about it, but we 
accepted the job and so I thought about it as maybe a pedagogical piece 
that did some of what Milton had done, but did it in a little bit different 
way for the Communists and the Marxists. And so we started to write 
this paper and the farther we got down that road now in the context of 
what we’d been doing in the classroom, we finally realized we didn’t 
have anything whatsoever to say about social responsibility of business 
in the way we were thinking about it before. But that what we were 
absolutely certain of was that competition in the way I had been trained 
and Bill had been trained in Chicago wasn’t going to ensure that the 
value of the firm got maximized. . . . I remember we gave our first ver-
sion of it at Rochester, before we went to Interlaken, in May. These are 
all our friends now, but a lot of them had come from Chicago. They 
hated it. They ran us out on a rail. . . . They accused us of being dead 
wrong. And they were really mad at us. (Michael Jensen, interviewed 
by Rakesh Khurana, April 2005; also see Jensen and Walkling 2011 for 
a very similar narrative.)
The first formulation of agency theory departed from the Chicago 
dogma in that it argued that the separation of ownership and control cre-
ates agency problems that competitive markets among firms are unable to 
solve. The solution, paradoxically, was to “theorize away” the corporation 
(Bratton 1989, 1499), to dissolve its boundaries into the market by treat-
ing, and indeed reshaping, it as a nexus of contracts between individuals. 
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The questions of hierarchy, which preoccupied a whole generation of 
anti-managerialist writers, and of organizational form thus became sim-
ply irrelevant. As Jensen and Meckling put it,
The private corporation or firm is simply one form of legal fiction, 
which serves as a nexus for contracting relationships and which is also 
characterized by the existence of divisible residual claims on the assets 
and cash flows of the organization which can generally be sold without 
permission of the other contracting individuals. (Jensen and Meckling 
1976, 311)
This view had two important implications: First, if the firm is like a 
market, then the usual concerns about corporate monopoly are irrelevant: 
“a large, monopolistic corporation is no longer a problem for the function-
ing of the market because it is actually and merely a group of individuals 
contracting with one another, not a massive and powerful entity in its own 
right” (Bratton 1989, 1499). In the neoliberal imaginary, contracts are not 
social artifacts bound by technology, law, and the distribution of power 
(Suchman 2003). They are only expressing the freedom and maximizing 
behavior of interacting individuals. Mediated by the individualistic meta-
phor of the free contract, the rhetoric and epistemic of the market might 
actually and legitimately sustain a social order in which large, even 
monopolistic, business formations reign supreme (Van Horn and Mirowski 
2009; Nik-Khah 2011; Van Horn 2011; Birch 2016). Consequently the firm 
is not a social entity. There is no collective project, no commonality of 
purpose or solidarity among the actors, no fiduciary duty, no coordination 
necessary beyond that which enhances the firm’s value for its owners—
the shareholders. If the whole turns out to be less valuable than the sum of 
the parts, then so be it! Shareholders have every right to sell the pieces for 
a profit. And they ought to have the right to demand that every unit within 
the firm help maximize shareholder value.
Jensen, Meckling, and their colleagues (including Jensen’s thesis adviser 
at Chicago, Eugene Fama) advocated for three corporate governance 
changes that would help reach the goal of shareholder value maximiza-
tion: monitoring managerial performance, providing comprehensive eco-
nomic incentives, and promoting an active market for corporate control, 
i.e., relying on external actions (such as hostile takeovers) to discipline 
corporate executives in underperforming firms. Monitoring managerial 
behavior involves the deployment of accounting practices, internal control 
systems, and the appointment of a professional board of directors whose 
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5. The number of US employees holding options rose from one million in 1992 to between 
seven and ten million in 2000 (Hall and Murphy 2003, 53).
6. Besides the original 1976 paper, this argument was developed prominently in Eugene F.
Fama, “Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm,” Journal of Political Economy 88, no. 2 
(1980), and in Eugene F. Fama and Michael C. Jensen, “Separation of Ownership and Control,” 
Journal of Law and Economics 26, no. 2 (1983).
members operate in the stockholders’ interest by virtue of their need to 
maintain their personal reputations. The alignment of incentives involves 
remunerating management in the form of company stock and stock 
options, so that managers, being turned into shareholders, will have the 
interests of owners at heart: self-interested employees will maximize 
shareholder value as a by-product of maximizing their own material gain. 
Importantly, two friends and co-authors of Jensen, Black and Scholes 
(1973), had just derived a valuation formula for such options, which was 
about to become enormously influential in the financial world (MacKen-
zie 2006). As options exchanges, powered by the new technique, started 
to thrive, the practice of remunerating managers (and other employees, 
particularly in the new economy) with stock options generalized, too.5 In 
a world of salaried managers, this was nothing short of a small revolu-
tion.6 Finally, the market for corporate control was said to lead to stock 
prices reflecting firm fundamentals, and to ensure that poorly performing 
“insider CEOs” will be threatened and ultimately replaced by efficiency 
and profit-oriented “outsiders CEOs.”
As Lazonick and O’Sullivan (2000) have shown, the extolling of share-
holder value came, in practice, to be associated with the downsizing of the 
labor force and an exponential rise in executive compensation. These 
trends came under fire during the 1980s, and were perceived as mounting 
evidence of corporate greed (see Appendix 1, which documents the rapid 
rise—or return—of these themes and language, using Google’s Ngram 
Viewer). To agency theorists, however, the new practices not only appeared 
scientifically more valid; they were inherently good, and corresponded to 
deeply held values and beliefs about how the world should work. By forc-
ing managers to reveal the truth about corporations, the recommendations 
of agency theory would, they believed, help prevent self-serving and 
unethical behaviors:
The following three things played a huge role in who Bill and I were 
and are. One is freedom of the individual. And what we were in life was 
all about creating a world in which individuals could be as free as pos-
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sible. . . . The second thing was we detest waste. And we were devoted 
to creating a world in which efficiency reigns, efficiency in the eco-
nomic sense. And the third thing was—and it took me years, a number 
of years later, to really formally recognize it—was that we both were 
devoted to creating a world in which honesty and integrity reigned 
supreme. (Michael Jensen interviewed by Rakesh Khurana, April 2005; 
also see Jensen and Walkling 2011)
The Social Trajectory of a Finance Professor
But how did the argument become the common sense of financial eco-
nomics and beyond? To understand this, we need to go back to two inter-
twined structural transformations within the fields of economics and 
higher education. Jensen, Meckling, and most of the people who devel-
oped agency theory in accounting, finance, and economics were not main-
stream economists—they were not even traditional economists in an insti-
tutional sense. Rather, they were the products—and in many ways the foot 
soldiers—of a new kind of institution: the scientific business school.
The Ford Foundation and the Emergence of 
the Scientific Business School
Until recently, scholars rarely paid attention to business schools as import-
ant sites of disciplinary training. And to some extent, they were right to do 
so: first, business schools, particularly in the 1960s, trained much smaller 
numbers of doctoral students than regular departments; second, they typ-
ically trained them in business disciplines (dominated by practitioners of 
accounting, management, and finance) rather than in the traditional social 
sciences; and third, disciplinary social scientists looked down on business 
schools as places of employment. For economics PhDs, business schools 
were near the bottom of the academic job market pecking order.
Things have changed dramatically since then, of course. Today’s econ-
omists often covet business school jobs, particularly at top institutions, 
because they pay so much better and often involve lighter teaching loads 
and more generous research support than regular economics departments. 
Business schools have moved aggressively into the regular economics job 
market; consequently, the boundary between the kinds of economists who 
populate arts and science departments and those who populate business 
schools has eroded significantly.
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The scientific business school emerged in the late 1950s, when the Ford 
Foundation diverted its vast resources away from controversial social 
questions and toward the education of a new generation of corporate elites. 
Foundation officials had become convinced that training in the so-called 
“behavioral sciences” would help managers organize production more 
efficiently and avoid conflicts with labor (Khurana 2007; Fourcade and 
Khurana 2013). The foundation established a grant program to support 
institutions that demonstrated their commitment to curricular reform. 
Among the successful applicants, two schools in particular stood out for 
their project to ground business education in science: the Graduate School 
of Industrial Administration (GSIA) at Carnegie-Tech, and the Graduate 
School of Business at the University of Chicago (Chicago GSB). The 
GSIA supported an integrated, interdisciplinary model rooted in engi-
neering, while the Chicago GSB was much more aggressive in its promo-
tion of economics as the core discipline around which the reform of busi-
ness training should take place.
W. Allen Wallis, the dean of the Chicago GSB from 1956 to 1962, 
crafted the new institutional strategy. Wallis was a Columbia-trained stat-
istician, but he had spent time in the Chicago economics department 
during the 1930s, where he had forged a life-long friendship with two 
fellow students, Milton Friedman and George Stigler. It is Friedman, 
indeed, who helped recruit him to the University of Chicago to found the 
Department of Statistics after the war. Like Friedman, Wallis was also a 
bona fide neoliberal: a member of the Mont Pelerin Society, he was later 
appointed undersecretary of state for economic affairs under Ronald Rea-
gan and finished his career at the American Enterprise Institute.
Once at the helm of the GSB, Wallis proceeded to upgrade the school’s 
research profile. The reformed GSB drew upon disciplinary faculty who 
were working in areas most closely related to business—statistics, 
accounting, law, but especially economics. Supported by the Ford Foun-
dation, the transformation was swift: Between 1957 and 1963, the number 
of doctoral candidates in the school’s programs increased from 18 to 70. 
Faculty ranks swelled to 70 members, with only 11 of the pre-Ford-reform 
faculty. Of the 51 faculty in 1959, 22 had a PhD in economics (Whitley 
1986). The trend continued into the 1960s with the next dean, economist 
George Schultz. According to our own calculations, in 2008, 62 percent of 
the faculty at the renamed Chicago Booth School of Business held a PhD 
in economics or finance; furthermore, at 71 members this group was more 
than twice as large as the economics department in the university’s arts 
and sciences division.
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A large proportion of the new recruits in the early 1960s held a joint 
appointment with the economics department, making the business school 
a de facto extension of that department, if not (given its size) a second 
economics department located at the university. Allen Wallis explained 
the policy by flatly stating that: “if a person wasn’t good enough in his 
field to be welcome in the appropriate department, we did not want him 
either” (Olkin 1991, 136). PhD students at the GSB were required to take 
classes from the department’s heavyweights—macroeconomics with Mil-
ton Friedman, microeconomics with Gary Becker. Such a close integra-
tion helped forge a certain unity within the Chicago approach, and 
strengthened its strategy of scientific legitimation vis-à-vis the broader 
field of economics, which was often perceived as hostile.
Corporate interests in the local business community also supported this 
organizational revamping. The school’s Associates Program enrolled the 
financial commitment of a hundred corporations. The banking giant Mer-
rill Lynch was interested in the development of empirical financial knowl-
edge, and it committed resources to the establishment and maintenance of 
a unique financial database at James Lorie’s Center for Research on Secu-
rity Prices. Additional funding came from private, often conservative foun-
dations, which George Stigler, in particular, pursued assiduously. These 
considerable institutional resources helped Stigler—together with Milton 
Friedman (his colleague in the economics department) and Aaron Direc-
tor (at the law school, an institution that also benefited from the Ford 
Foundation largesse)—push forward an intellectual program that sought 
to transform prevailing views about government, markets, and corpora-
tions. Together with his GSB colleagues Sam Pelzman and Merton Miller, 
Stigler helped provide a rationale for the movement of deregulation that 
took place in the 1980s and to support the benign view of antitrust 
defended by much of the Chicago-originated law and economics scholar-
ship, according to which “only explicit price fixing and very large hori-
zontal mergers (mergers to monopoly) were worthy of serious concern” 
(Posner 1979, 933; also see Nik-Khah 2011).
Perhaps the most visible consequence of the institutionalization of a 
powerful economics core within American business schools, and at the 
Chicago GSB in particular, was the transformation of the field of finance, 
traditionally dominated by qualitative practitioners (chartists and finan-
cial analysts), into “financial economics” during the 1960s. This evolution 
was hugely consequential for the future of financial technologies and 
practices, enabling the rise of financial engineering (MacKenzie 2006), as 
well as for the subsequent trajectories of both fields. Building on modern 
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7. The most tireless advocate of the approach, Fischer Black, bridged both the academic
world and the world of practice at Arthur D. Little, then the University of Chicago (where he 
came as Ford foundation professor in 1971), MIT, and, finally, Goldman Sachs.
probability theory and the formalization of stochastic processes, the aca-
demic and worldly practice of finance was scientized; conversely, the sci-
entific practice of economics was transformed by the application of a 
financial lens.
According to Mehrling (2005, 82) modern finance theory arguably 
originates in the desire to make theoretical sense of a statistically “star-
tling fact”: if you graph the price of a stock over time, it will look no dif-
ferent than a series tracking cumulative coin flips. In other words, it is 
impossible to game the market. It is through this “no arbitrage” condition 
that the empirical phenomenon of random stock price fluctuations would 
be connected to the notion of equilibrium in economic theory (Jovanovic 
2008, 223–24). Later reframed as the “efficient capital markets hypothe-
sis,” or, for short, efficient markets hypothesis (EMH) by Eugene Fama, 
the theory posits that, if agents are risk-neutral, the prices of securities 
always perfectly reflect all known information; consequently, a firm’s 
stock price is the best reflector of that firm’s fundamental economic value. 
Only new information can impact stock prices, and to the extent that new 
information emerges randomly, then the movement of stock prices is, 
indeed, a “random walk” (Fama 1970). The rates of return on all assets 
are equal to the rate of return on the risk-free asset. By relying simultane-
ously on empirical fact and economic theory, the EMH provided both a 
definition of market efficiency and a description of the world in which 
financial markets were, indeed, efficient.
Other financial economists immediately critiqued both the statistical 
interpretation of the phenomenon and its theoretical explanation. The con-
cept of efficient markets is merely an idealization, they argued. In prac-
tice, rates of asset returns differ and agents are risk averse. This perspec-
tive was embodied in an alternative, more practically oriented, approach: 
the capital asset pricing model (CAPM), which connected asset risk and 
return in a mathematically tractable way. With some important excep-
tions, the leaders and promoters of the CAPM were primarily located on 
the US east coast, and specifically in the Cambridge, Massachusetts, intel-
lectual community that spanned MIT, Harvard Business School, and the 
management consulting firm with MIT roots, Arthur D. Little.7
The EMH and the CAPM had much in common, as well. The two 
approaches co-evolved in the 1960s and 1970s through constant intellec-
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8. In an important critique, Lawrence Summers (1986) shows that statistical tests have very
low power to reject alternative theories to the ECMH, but this should not be taken to mean that 
the hypothesis must be accepted as valid.
tual exchanges and overlapping social networks, and they have arguably 
converged since then (Mehrling 2005). But it is the EMH version of price 
efficiency, not the CAPM, which truly captured the imagination of the 
later generations of finance academics (Polillo 2015). First, it offered a 
convenient mathematical foundation with a clear economic meaning, 
opening up new scientific possibilities, and propping up a cottage industry 
of academic papers:
The assumption that the ECMH is true makes it possible to do a lot 
of interesting and fun things in financial economics and corporate 
law. . . . It is a highly useful tool and even though its strict truth cannot 
be defended any longer without substantial supplementation, we do not 
have as yet a single better story of how prices are set or what constitutes 
fundamental value of a security. More realism tends to overwhelm us. 
(Allen 2003, 558)
Second, not only did the EMH fit quite naturally into Chicago’s sig-
nature approach to economics—free-market-oriented and interested in 
the predictive power of the theory over the realism of assumptions—it 
was promoted in a voluntaristic manner as a key element of the Chicago 
“brand” (Mehrling 2016). Third, unlike the CAPM, which repeatedly 
failed empirical tests, the EMH appeared to be empirically irrefutable, 
even though much of that irrefutability was rooted in the low power of 
statistical tests.8 Fama’s reliance on standard econometric techniques, in 
fact, helped Chicago to discredit CAPM, “build bridges with others,” and 
tie scholars into a coherent social network (Polillo 2015, 30). Finally, the 
approach was practically useful. Here was a way to talk about value— 
“fundamental value”—that completely sidestepped the elusiveness of the 
concept, and seemed to offer instead an “objective, useful and safe” stan-
dard in the form of a stock price that incorporates all publicly available 
information (Allen 2003, 558).
From Chicago to Rochester
One way to interpret agency theory as a product of the finance revolu-
tion has precisely to do with the financial markets’ efficiency at pricing 
the value of a firm (in spite of their different assumptions on agents’ risk 
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9. Fama’s approach, however, inspired a GSB student—David Booth—to set up a financial
investment firm, Dimensional Fund Advisors, where Fama also serves as a close consultant. In 
2008, Booth donated $300 million to the Chicago business school, which was thereby renamed 
in his honor.
10. Consistent with the CAPM approach, this suggested that mutual funds should not cherry
pick stocks—holding the market is the best strategy.
aversion and preferences; both EMH and CAPM agree on that). Jensen 
and Meckling show that value is not simply revealed by this process. It 
can also be created. By using stock prices to convey a signal to corporate 
managers, shareholders can direct them to squeeze out firm inefficiencies. 
In other words, and paraphrasing Donald MacKenzie’s (2006) paraphras-
ing of Milton Friedman, shareholder value is not simply like a camera 
taking a snapshot of what the firm is worth. It is also an engine to help 
generate that worth, by making the firm more efficient and aligning the 
behavior of managers with the interests of their principals—that is, bring-
ing them ever closer to the ideal rational agent.
The connections among the modern finance theorists (both EMH and 
CAPM) were not simply intellectual of course. Michael Jensen studied 
with and then under Eugene Fama at the Chicago GSB (they were similar 
in age, and Fama was hired directly from the Chicago school’s graduate 
program) and collaborated closely with him. The affinity is clear, but we 
still need to explain the intellectual trajectory. Even at Chicago, the prac-
tical problems of corporations seemed trivial and not much worth an 
economist’s time. Chicago scholars were interested in economics and 
markets first, and looked down upon the practical problems internal to 
firms. And thus aside from providing a rationale for deregulation, Chicago 
faculty had very few prescriptions to offer American corporations—as 
they did governments, incidentally. As we suggested earlier, Stigler’s stan-
dard line—that competitive pressures would keep firms on their feet—
made Chicago-originated price theory somewhat irrelevant to the ques-
tion of how corporations should be managed. This was the paradox of a 
business school science that had little to teach business. Even Fama’s 
EMH seemed, at least in the initial formulation, to have little practical 
advice to offer, since stock returns are unpredictable and thus markets 
cannot consistently be gamed.9 One of Jensen’s first published papers, 
written while a graduate student at the University of Chicago, showed—
much to the chagrin of professional portfolio managers but consistent with 
Fama’s theory—that mutual funds performed no better than the market10 
(Jensen 1968).
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The less public, more silent revolution, however, was taking place in 
classrooms—and it owed much to the reconfiguration of higher education 
brought about by the ongoing expansion of business schools. In 1963, 
shortly after launching the first phase of the curricular reforms at the Chi-
cago GSB, Allen Wallis was persuaded to accept the presidency of the 
University of Rochester—a job he would hold for twenty years. Once 
there, his first move was to start a business school in the Chicago mold, 
drawing on financial support from the local business community. Wallis 
hired William Meckling, a former Chicago economics doctoral student 
and fellow Mont Pelerin Society member, as dean of the new institution, 
and together they began to assemble a critical mass of University of 
Chicago-trained young economists to teach business subjects. Between 
1970 and 1995, fourteen of the faculty members hired at the Rochester/
Simon School of Business had obtained their PhD at the University of 
Chicago. The next institution, Carnegie Mellon, contributed only four. 
Meckling himself remained dean for nineteen years, profoundly shaping 
the institution. A former student recalled that:
There was a deep connection with the Chicago economics depart-
ment. . . . That’s where the real Jesus lived. In Chicago. And everybody 
else was sort of, just wanted to be like Chicago. . . . You know, Friedman’s 
notes were what our qualifying exams were formed from. . . . Basically a 
paper version of Friedman’s notes that I just carried around with me wher-
ever I went. That’s what you did. There it is, still right there. They’re right 
here. [taking document] I mean, the idea that you would be without this 
document. How could you move without this document, right? This is 
like, this is how you learned price theory. What else is there?
Question: So this is basically like a course book?
Answer: Well. . . it’s like his type-written notes. Friedman’s type-written 
class notes. (Anonymous interviewed by Khurana, November 2010)
The quote expresses vividly the intellectual and emotional bonds 
between the two institutions. Rochester was a satellite of Chicago, and it 
was perhaps the most zealous and loyal satellite. At the same time, the 
distance from Chicago, as well as the specific demands that the school 
faced from its patrons and publics, were a source of autonomy, and helped 
spur a reorientation of the research framework. The Rochester area was the 
second largest economic region in New York State. Major companies had 
their headquarters (Eastman Kodak and Bausch and Lomb) or significant 
operations (Xerox, IBM, and Corning) in the area. The University of 
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11. This did not last: much of the University of Rochester’s endowment was in stock from
Kodak (the university was founded thanks to the bequest of George Eastman, founder of Kodak 
Eastman) and other local companies. However, this capital shrunk as a result of the changing 
economic climate of the 1980s, forcing the university to downsize severely.
Rochester was “flush with capital”: it had the third largest endowment in 
the country throughout much of the 1960s, thanks to the support of local 
patrons (Amadae and de Mesquita 1999, 279).11 The business school 
itself was a pioneer in the development of a successful—and lucrative—
executives’ program.
After obtaining their degrees, Rochester business school graduates 
were destined to feed into the local industrial basin. But the dry price the-
ory inherited from Chicago lectures (upon which the new scientific busi-
ness school curriculum was built) did not appeal much to them, and they 
insisted that their teachers be practice oriented. From below, the faculty 
thus faced the pressure to be directly relevant; from above, they still had 
to be scientists (they were Chicago students after all). Furthermore, they 
were acutely aware of their peripheral position in the broader field of eco-
nomics. They were young and the school was brand new (the first Roches-
ter MBA degree was awarded in 1962). Indeed, in the interview with the 
second author, Jensen had no problem acknowledging that it was then “a 
third-rate place.” Most of the newly hired had gotten their PhDs from the 
Chicago business school—rather than the economics department—an 
oddity at the time and certainly a mark of lesser status. Their scientific 
papers were going nowhere: even the Chicago-dominated Journal of 
Political Economy would not publish them. Fama was a strong supporter, 
but he, too, was somewhat isolated; perhaps the fact that he had been edu-
cated at the GSB, in economics and finance, continued to act as an invisi-
ble, but nonetheless real, status barrier.
Sociologist Pierre Bourdieu has suggested that newcomers in a field 
who are “outside the beaten tracks cannot ‘beat the dominant at their own 
game’ unless they make additional, strictly scientific investments from 
which they cannot expect high profits, at least in the short run, since the 
whole logic of the system is against them” (1975, 30, emphasis added). On 
the symbolic front, Rochester scholars mobilized scientific institutions 
and language in a deliberate manner. “Positive” theories sprung up in 
political science around William Riker and in accounting around Watts 
and Zimmermann, durably impacting both fields and entrenching the 
influence of economics within them. Echoing Milton Friedman’s (1953) 
article on “the methodology of positive economics,” the accountants con-
trasted their own approach, dubbed “positive,” to older, less scientific 
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12. The Carnegie-Rochester conference series, started by Karl Brunner, has become famous
for publishing the “Lucas critique” of econometrics in its first issue.
13. Eugene Fama, in particular, co-authored extensively with Rochester faculty and stu-
dents. Also see the useful data reported by the Journal of Financial Economics website at 
http://jfe.rochester.edu/Decade_inst.pdf.
ones, called “normative.” Jensen similarly described the shift in finance 
theory as one from “normative questions such as ‘What should invest-
ment, financing, or dividend policies, be?’ to positive theories addressing 
questions such as ‘What are the effects of alternative investment, financing, 
or dividend policies on the value of the firm?’” (Jensen 1984, 2, empha-
sis added). Like Friedman, both groups anchored their disciplinary claims 
in the view that free markets are generally efficient and, in a prediction- 
oriented methodology, focused on shareholder value.
Institutional investments complemented intellectual ones. In the 1970s, 
Rochester scholars established new scholarly reviews in economics, 
finance and accounting: The Journal of Accounting and Economics 
(JA&E), The Journal of Financial Economics (JFE), the Journal of Mon-
etary Economics, and the Carnegie-Rochester conferences series in pub-
lic policy12 were all originated and edited there. The journals created new 
scientific circuits for the rapidly expanding fields, and served as vehicles 
for the new approaches to macroeconomics, financial economics, and 
accounting: Rochester faculty and students built their academic reputation 
in part through these publications. For instance, 16 percent of the articles 
in the JFE and 23 percent of the articles in the JA&E between 1970 and 
2012 had at least one Rochester affiliate as author. In other major journals 
in finance or accounting, by contrast, Rochester’s presence never reached 
beyond 5 percent. The Rochester journals also helped cultivate the con-
nection with Chicago (and Carnegie-Mellon), particularly in their first two 
decades of existence. Among all the papers published in the JFE since its 
founding (in 1974) to 2006, Chicago authors have published the most 
(123), followed by University of Rochester faculty (114).13 Interestingly, 
Harvard becomes the dominant player after 2000. Finally, if we look at 
PhD of origin (Fig. 2), then the preponderance of the Chicago-Rochester 
group is even more overwhelming, accounting for close to 50 percent of 
the top 40 publishing authors in the journal.
These disciplinary strategies would prove, in the end, effective in help-
ing their authors claim—or reclaim—an edge vis-à-vis the mainstream 
in economics, as well as their Chicago forebears, with whom they enter-
tained a complex relationship, simultaneously deferential and competi-
tive. Operating on the symbolic (and paradigmatic) edges of the economics 
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profession, the Rochester scholars sought, consciously or unconsciously, to 
bridge their distance from the center of the field by engaging in forms of 
scientific activism and by enrolling allies from outside of academia. The 
money started to come in, too. In 1986, former secretary of the treasury 
(under Ford) and leverage buy-out investor William E. Simon coordinated, 
together with conservative foundations, a major donation of $15 million 
(the school’s endowment before that was $3 million). Grateful, the school 
renamed itself after him. In an interview with the New York Times, “Simon 
said that he agreed to donate and raise money for Rochester because he 
strongly believes in the business school’s staunch free-market philosophy 
and its grounding in economic analysis” (Schmitt 1986). From 1977 until 
his death in 2000, Simon was president of the very conservative John M. 
Olin Foundation, the foundation most responsible for funneling funds to 
conservative scholars in American universities, in order to build a pro-free-
market counter-intelligentsia (Mayer 2016). He practiced this advocacy 
himself: in several book-length pamphlets Simon called for would-be 
philanthropists to rush their millions to help the cause of “liberty” and for 
businesses to truly implement free-market capitalism (1978, 230–31).
If it had only been about the science, the theories marshaled out of Chi-
cago and closely related institutions, like Rochester, might have remained 
“pretty, polite techniques for a well-paneled boardroom,” (Keynes 1937) 
Figure 2 PhD origins of the top 40 publishing authors in the Journal 
of Financial Economics, 1974–2006. (percentages)
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14. On “state-phobia” as a uniting theme in neoliberal thought, see Foucault 2008, 75–76.
with little relevance to politics and little purchase on the world. But we 
would not be talking about a neoliberal revolution if that had been the case. 
Of course, what happened is that economists in the Chicago orbit, and 
philosophical acolytes in the conservative movement, became allies in an 
effort to push back against the greedy hand of government.14 Chicago 
scholars, Friedman first among them, voiced their views on many ques-
tions of public interest, from the draft to rent control to anti-poverty poli-
cies. Supported by conservative foundations, they published bestsellers, 
wrote in the business and general press, helped set up think tanks (Mitchell 
2007; Mirowski and Plehwe 2009; Van Horn, Mirowski, and Stapleford 
2011), and lobbied public authorities (MacKenzie 2006). Friedman himself 
produced a pedagogical series for American public television. And they 
successfully enrolled political and economic allies in the process. Indeed, 
some (Allen Wallis, George Schultz, and countless students of theirs) heard 
the call when Ronald Reagan was elected and moved to Washington.
What gave particular visibility and influence to agency theory, in par-
ticular, was that its promoters made considerable efforts to disseminate 
their ideas and findings beyond traditional academic channels—into the 
classroom and the wider world of practice. Unlike their more purist disci-
plinary brethren, the new finance scholars cultivated their connections to 
the markets, as principals in or consultants to private firms, and agency 
theorists were no exception (Fox 2011). There was a missionary zeal about 
the whole enterprise: appearing relevant to practitioners—e.g., corporate 
boards and asset managers—was a powerful source of legitimation, par-
ticularly vindicated in the increasingly assertive business school field. 
Relevance, however, was not enough. Agency theorists wanted to change 
people’s minds and practices. As Jensen put it in his course material, those 
who taught the course subscribed to the idea that real learning leads to 
(and is evidenced by) changes in behavior. This belief has remained an 
important philosophical underpinning of the O and M [Organization and 
Management] group at Harvard. As the instructors put it in their course 
material, “We do not just teach; we are devoted to making a difference in 
peoples’ lives.” But a change in behavior almost always means giving up 
an associated way of thinking, and giving up a way of thinking is almost 
always a painful process (Jensen et al., 1997, 6).
The core course Jensen and Meckling developed around agency theory, 
Coordination, Control and the Management of Organizations (more pop-
ularly known as CCMO), became the most successful elective course at 
Rochester business school. It came to be seen as so central to the school’s 
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15. Note that Jensen’s friend Fischer Black had left MIT and taken a position with Goldman
Sachs at about the same time(Figlewski 1995, 95).
identity that the dean later turned it into a requirement of the MBA curric-
ulum (Jensen et al. 1997). Originally started as an attempt to teach price 
theory to business students, the course quickly evolved into an overarch-
ing framework applicable to a wide range of phenomena, including human 
resource management, labor economics, organizational behavior, finance, 
governance, and corporate control. The course consisted of three mod-
ules. The first module introduced students to the foundational papers 
around the problems of agency and agency costs. The second module 
applied this framework to a variety of organizational situations and prob-
lems found inside organizations, including incentive systems and budget-
ing systems. The third module applied the constructs of agency theory 
and agency costs to examining corporate governance more broadly and 
the impact of capital markets, debt structures, and takeovers in disciplin-
ing managers and restoring efficiency.
From Rochester to Harvard, and on to the World
Places higher up in the business school status order started taking notice 
of the changes in tone and philosophy. In 1984, Michael Jensen moved to 
Harvard Business School, first at half time and then full time. His reloca-
tion to the (still) most powerful institution in the field of business educa-
tion was not without costs, however. To the world he came from, he looked 
like the prodigal son who forgets his true origins. By accepting a posi-
tion at Harvard, Jensen revealed a “practical” habitus that was much less 
appealing to his economics brethren, who sought to remain scientifically 
pure. His Rochester colleague and long-time associate Bill Meckling, for 
instance, saw the move as a sell-out. Some people in the Chicago crowd 
were even more negative, also faulting him for messing with the world.
But Harvard Business School was a real consecration vis-à-vis the 
practical world of business.15 It offered something new, an influential pub-
lic platform from which to broadcast one’s ideas toward finance practi-
tioners, to purge them of their unscientific beliefs and practices (Jovanovic 
2008, 221). The classroom, once again, was the pivotal institution. During 
Jensen’s tenure at Harvard Business School (1985–2000), the CCMO 
course went from enrolling a few hundred students to over six hundred, or 
more than two-thirds of each year’s MBA cohort (see Fig. 3). Harvard, 
furthermore, provided closer connections to the corporate world through 
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the weight given to case studies (Jensen started writing cases in the early 
1990s), their worldwide diffusion through the Harvard publishing 
machine, and through executive education programs with prominent com-
panies (Jensen and Walkling 2011, 10).
The press was the other vehicle. Harvard, again, was at the core of the 
diffusion process, as agency theorists marshaled their ideas in the influen-
tial Harvard Business Review (HBR). It is in the pages of the review that 
Jensen, for instance, came out forcefully in favor of takeovers (Jensen 1984), 
stock options for CEOs (Jensen and Murphy 1990; also see Murphy 1986); 
and private equity (Jensen 1989). Meanwhile, the Harvard position gave 
agency theorists more authority in national newspapers, such as the New 
York Times, the Washington Post and the Wall Street Journal. Using dra-
matic examples, they explained the changing business environment and 
offered concrete prescriptions to improve corporate profitability, all of 
which had to do with properly aligning managerial incentives.
To be sure, corporate raiders had initiated the new rationale and corre-
sponding practices (Heilbron, Verheul and Quak 2014). But they were not 
popular, often described as lone wolves coming out of nowhere, leaving 
vulnerable corporations in shambles. In 1985, T. Boone Pickens made the 
cover of Time magazine, portrayed as a poker player. The raiders elicited 
Figure 3 Enrollments in the CCMO course, Harvard Business School, 
1985–1997.
* no classes taught in 1985–6. Source: Jensen et al. 1997, p. 170.
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16. See Jensen and Ruback (1983) for a review of the agency literature on this topic.
17. See Jensen (1984). Part of Jensen’s argument in this article was that those who were
against takeovers engaged in “folklore,” whereas his views were grounded in “science.”
a mix of fascination and fear. Agency theorists explained that the dread 
they inspired was actually a good thing. It was the best way to discipline 
supposedly wasteful managers. They argued that the deregulation that 
enabled hostile takeovers had resulted in a more efficient allocation of the 
rights to control corporate assets. Managers who were unable to run their 
companies efficiently, as measured primarily by the firm’s stock price, 
should suffer the consequences in the form of a takeover; the prosperity of 
takeover entrepreneurs and imaginative investment bankers was a sign 
that there was value to be unlocked from American corporations.16 Jensen 
himself described T. Boone Pickens not as a financial speculator but as an 
“inventor” whose insights into improving a firm’s value were intellectual 
property, the value of which should rightly accrue to its originator (Jensen 
1987). Pickens, for his part, reportedly handed out copies of Jensen’s 
famous Harvard Business Review article defending takeovers.17 Jensen 
also defended Pickens’s business strategy against his critics and criticized 
an adverse legal decision by the Delaware Supreme Court (Jensen 1985). 
Figure 4 Citations of Michael Jensen in US media
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The same year, he extolled takeover activities as beneficial to society in 
Congressional hearings, citing higher stock prices as evidence (Vise 
1985). Finally, he was not shy about writing for or speaking to the general 
news media or specialized business magazines. Figure 4 below reports on 
citations of Jensen in both, showing his rising presence in the general 
press in the early 1980s, and in the business media in the later part of the 
decade and into the 1990s.
As Hirsch (1986), Scherer (1988a, b), and Dobbin and Zorn (2005) have 
argued, the real impact of agency theory was cultural: its promoters were 
able to back up a nascent market for corporate control with their authorita-
tive voice, helping shareholder value triumph as the new measuring rod of 
corporate performance. Jensen and Meckling, Scherer writes, “[changed] 
the semantics—from the ‘separation of ownership and control’ of Berle 
and Means, with its ominous negative ring, to the much better sounding 
challenge of securing the optimal relationship between principals (stock-
holders) and agents (managers)” (Scherer 1988b).
The figures below (Fig. 5 and 6) report the rapid rise in mentions of the 
terms “shareholder value” in academic journals and in major business and 
news sources. The data demonstrate the leading role played by the Wall 
Street Journal in the very early years and the Financial Times at the peak 
(on this point, also see Heilbron, Verheul, and Quak 2014). It also shows a 
striking pattern of diffusion, with a salient inflexion point around 1985 
(which, incidentally, is the year that Jensen came to Harvard Business 
School). The explicit connections between the two movements (the aca-
demic and the practical) became apparent around the same time to observ-
ers. For instance, a 1985 article in Institutional Investor remarked that 
Jensen “has come out in favor of corporate raiders and greenmailers to the 
point of developing an economic rationale for takeovers”:
Jensen, Jarrell, Ruback, and a coterie of other researchers, mostly like-
minded Chicago or Rochester alums, have a new tune for the pun-
dits and pear-shaped executives who agitate for a return to the days of 
genteel board luncheons and smaller block trades. They sing loud, and 
Jensen the loudest. Their stage is Jensen’s research center, which funds 
conferences and such studies as “Antimerger Policy and Stockholder 
Returns: A Re-Examination of the Market Power Hypothesis,” “Take-
Over Defenses via Corporate Charter Amendments and Their Effects 
on Stockholder Welfare” and “Raiders or Saviors?: The Evidence on 
Six Controversial Investors.” Their fan-club newsletter is Jensen’s Jour-
nal of Financial Economics, which publishes much of this research. 
(VerMuelen 1985, 75)
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18. We used Factiva to search the Wall Street Journal and New York Times (largely because
the Wall Street Journal is not accessible via LexisNexis) but we found that Factiva generated a 
lot of duplicates for the Financial Times (because it searches multiple editions and thus “finds” 
the same article more than once), so we used LexisNexis to search the Financial Times.
19. In 1952, less than 10 percent of US equity was owned by institutional investors. This
share reached 30 percent in 1976. By 2006, it exceeded 70 percent (Gillan and Stuart 2007, 57).
But the fastest growth in popularity, both within academic fields and in 
the business press, comes in the 1990s.18
Agency theorists, in short, helped “plant the idea that the most import-
ant people in any company are not the employees or the managers but the 
owners—the stockholders and bondholders” (Cassidy 2002). In less than 
twenty years, shareholder value entered the everyday language of busi-
ness. Its generation became the established purpose of a corporation’s 
existence and activities and the lingua franca of investors. Using the lan-
guage of shareholder capitalism, financial analysts, money managers, 
institutional investors, and hedge funds (in the 2000s) advocated for the 
expansion of shareholder rights and the removal of restraints on their 
own behavior.19 With their coffers overflowing with pension funds and 
Figure 5 Mentions of the term “shareholder value” in selected 
academic literatures, 1970–2010. Source: JSTOR.
Figures 6a and b. Mentions of the terms “Shareholder Value” in major 
news and business sources (Factiva) and, below, in selected news sources 
(Factiva and LexisNexis), 1980–2014.
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401K dollars, and under pressure (and financial inducement) to deliver 
higher-than-average returns, institutional investors, in particular, pro-
moted shareholder value as a practice that was in the best interest of US 
companies—and thus in the interest of workers, too (Drucker 1986; Dob-
bin and Zorn 2005; Davis 2009).
It is uncertain that shareholder activism succeeded in improving the 
performance of US firms in the end (Gillan and Stark 2007). What is 
clearer is that, contrary to the promises of the movement, workers and 
pensioners did not gain much from these actions (Fligstein and Shin 
2004). Despite the anti-managerial rhetoric, managers were the main 
beneficiaries (Goldstein 2012). The compensation packages of corpo-
rate executives went through the roof in the 1990s, fueling a massive 
increase in social inequalities (Piketty and Saez 2003). The ratio of 
CEO to worker pay rose from 30:1 to over 400:1 in 2000. The largest 
proportion of the growth was attributable to a shift from salary to equity 
in executive compensation (see, e.g., Murphy 2012)—a shift directly 
traceable to the arguments promoted by agency theorists through the 
twenty preceding years. In 1984, while still at the University of Roch-
ester business school, Jensen and his young colleague Kevin J. Murphy 
had organized a conference on executive pay, the main conclusions of 
which they disseminated in business publications and in a New York 
Times editorial titled “The Flap over Executive Pay: Beware the Self- 
Serving Critics”:
Shareholders, taxpayers, consumers and voters must be wary of 
wolves dressed in sheepskin currently attacking executive compen-
sation to achieve their own ends. Many assert that executives are 
overpaid and paid in a way that is independent of performance. Note-
worthy is the lack of accusation of fraud or illegal behavior. Most 
important, the attack has excited little support on the part of share-
holders, who, after all, pay the bill. Shareholders recognize that there 
is no issue, a conclusion supported by the best scientific evidence cur-
rently available. The consensus of more than 60 leading academi-
cians at a recent University of Rochester conference was that execu-
tive salaries are determined by the market, and that changes in 
compensation are strongly related to company performance. More-
over, no one expressed concern that compensation was ‘‘too high.’’ 
(Jensen and Murphy 1984)
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Epilogue
As late as 1990, the Business Roundtable, a leading business organization, 
still officially adhered to a traditional “stakeholder” view of the corpora-
tion, embedded in its official statement on corporate governance:
Corporations are chartered to serve both their shareholders and soci-
ety as a whole. The interests of the shareholders are primarily mea-
sured in terms of economic return over time. The interests of others 
in society (other stakeholders) are defined by their relationship to the 
corporation. . . .
The central corporate governance point to be made about a corpora-
tion’s stakeholders beyond the shareholder is that they are vital to the 
long-term successful economic performance of the corporation. Some 
argue that only the interests of the shareholders should be considered 
by directors. The thrust of history and law strongly supports the broader 
view of the directors’ responsibility to carefully weigh the interests of 
all stakeholders as part of their responsibility to the corporation or to 
the long-term interests of its shareholders. 
By 1997 however, this language had been swept away. The views 
defended by agency theorists and now widely institutionalized in the 
management practices and pay structures of American corporations had 
become the organization’s new lingua franca, the new common sense of 
capital in the neoliberalized corporation:
In the Business Roundtable’s view, the paramount duty of management 
and of boards of directors is to the corporation’s stockholders; the inter-
ests of other stakeholders are relevant as a derivative of the duty to the 
stockholders. The notion that the board must somehow balance the 
interests of other stakeholders fundamentally misconstrues the role of 
directors. It is, moreover, an unworkable notion because it would leave 
the board with no criterion for resolving conflicts between the interests 
of stockholders and of other stakeholders or among different groups of 
stakeholders. (Business Roundtable 1997)
The conversion looked complete. The shareholder-maximization 
imperative advocated by agency theorists, corporate raiders, CEOs and 
the shareholder movement was taken for granted. Firms were increasingly 
evaluated on the basis not of returns on investments but returns on equity 
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21. See Erhard and Jensen 2015.
(Levy 2014). New accounting methods (fair value or mark-to-market 
accounting, also developed at Rochester business school) sustained these 
new profit calculations and helped valorize strategies of growth based on 
debt-fueled asset purchases. Contrary to expectations, executive pay had 
remained disconnected from stock market performance, as tightly net-
worked corporate board members had each other’s backs (Khurana 2002). 
Derivative shareholder value management recipes, such as companies 
buying back their own stock to pump up prices, often diverted available 
cash from more productive uses.
Critiques mounted. By the early 2000s, a wave of corporate scandals 
(Enron and WorldCom among others) put many of the recommenda-
tions of agency theory into question, prompting its authors to argue that 
they had been misused and misunderstood. This may have been true: in 
an article titled “The Misapplication of Mr. Michael Jensen,” Dobbin 
and Jung (2010; also see Jung and Dobbin 2014) suggest that agency 
theorists had failed to anticipate how their prescriptions would interact 
with the incentive structure faced by the most important actors in the 
financial markets, namely institutional investors. Instead of increasing 
efficiency, the uneven implementation of these prescriptions had trans-
lated into excessive risk-taking, untempered by adequate monitoring 
and transparency.
Jensen’s own analysis of the causes of this misinterpretation, how-
ever, was more benign: it had little to do with the theory, and much to 
do with bad ethics. He had retired to Florida from Harvard Business 
School, but his conviction and energy for persuasion were intact. The 
crisis, in fact, seemed to open up opportunities for a new moral enter-
prise. The disaster of 2008 taught us that “without [integrity], nothing 
works,” Jensen (2009) argued. In November 2015, he released a work-
ing paper on SSRN, the open-access publishing website he founded 
some twenty years earlier.20 Abounding in citations of Thomas Kuhn, 
the piece21 suggests that another paradigm shift in economics is around 
the corner, which will model integrity as a production factor. Using a 
rhetoric that has become familiar by now, it outlines “a new theory [of] 
integrity as a purely positive phenomenon with no normative aspects 
whatsoever.”
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